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1. Introduction 
The biological sciences have always proven a fertile ground for philosophical analysis, one from which 
has grown a rich tradition stemming from Aristotle and flowering with Darwin. And although 
contemporary philosophy is increasingly becoming conceptually entwined with the study of the empirical 
sciences with the data of the latter now being regularly utilised in the establishment and defence of the 
frameworks of the former, a practice especially prominent in the philosophy of physics, the development 
of that tradition hasn‟t received the wider attention it so thoroughly deserves. This review will briefly 
introduce some recent significant topics of debate within the philosophy of biology, focusing on those 
whose metaphysical themes (in everything from composition to causation) are likely to be of wide-
reaching, cross-disciplinary interest.  
 
2. Evolutionary Classification 
In a post-Darwinian age, one of the most important and well-known changes in our philosophical 
thought about the biological world has been the paradigm shift wherein attention turned away from 
sharply and eternally defined natural kinds and so, away from individuals as a central theoretical focus, and 
toward vaguely bounded and contingently stable species, with populations taking the theoretical fore (Hull 
1965; Mayr 1994; Sober 1980). In this shift, an organism‟s developmental architecture and its role in trait-
building was de-emphasised in favour of analysing instead the correlational statistical trends between 
population traits and their corresponding genomic profiles. However, this shift also brought a renewed 
focus on another, more finely-grained class of individuals known as homologues – modular organismal sub-
systems responsible for the building of a particular trait that are present throughout successive 
generations of organism groups which exhibit broad morphological similarity among their various (intra- 
and inter-species) instances over traceable lineages of modification history (Scotland 2010). A prime 
exemplar is the tetrapod limb: examining the limbs of everything from bat wings to human arms seemingly 
reveals the existence of a single archetypal individual whose morphologically distinct instances are ordered 
by relations of successive variation in distinct groups of organisms over evolutionary time-scales. 
However, the contemporary effort to better understand these „evolutionary individuals‟ has raised an 
important philosophical question, one which reflects the aforementioned paradigm shift: do these 
individuals carve at the ontological joints of the evolutionary landscape, or are they merely heuristic 
abstractions constructed from it? Deciding between these two perspectives – the developmental and 
phylogenetic, respectively – is the focus of the debate on the nature of homologues.  
The phylogenetic view, the view most naturally aligned with the spirit of the populationist 
conception of species, has a variation first perspective: homologues are merely „idealised types‟ constructed 
from comparative paleontological and anatomical studies on the morphological similarity of a certain 
feature among organism lineages (Grant & Kluge 2004; Cracraft 2005; Love 2009). On this view, in other 
words, although the morphological differences between the wing of a bat and the arm of a human can be 
subsumed under a certain structural type, they are so only conceptually, and only as a matter of 
convention – the “unity” between these morphologically disparate forms doesn‟t amount to identity. The 
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developmental view, taking a stability first perspective, sees it the other way around: the „type‟ that defines a 
homologue consists of a set of intrinsic causal capacities which persist through, and are themselves 
explanatory with respect to the morphological particularities which it displays throughout its historical 
lineage. On this view, one and the same structure lies beneath the bat‟s wing and the human‟s arm, and 
the morphological disparities between them are only varied surface-level reflections of the generative 
potential of that underlying structure.     
Although the phylogenetic approach is the historically prominent one, recent years have seen a 
rise in defenders of the developmental perspective, in large part due to the advent of advances in 
evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo), a research programme centred on studying evolutionary 
transitions in organismal form via the modification history of the developmental mechanisms underlying 
homologous structures (Davidson & Erwin 2006; Canestro et al. 2007; Wagner 2014). However, 
according to the phylogenetic perspective, its rival faces an insurmountable task – that of illustrating 
genuine (and not merely conceptual) unity among the morphological variations of a homologue 
throughout its occurrence in a wide variety of organisms in such a way that each is an instance of a single, 
repeated individual; as Owen‟s (1848) famous definition makes clear (“[t]he same organ in different animals 
under every variety of form and function”),  „homology‟ is about sameness, not mere similarity.1 
Without wishing to deny the substantial morphological variation among their instances, 
developmentalists, trading on a popular move in the metaphysics of „natural kinds‟ (Boyd 1999), have 
suggested that perhaps a homologue is best understood as a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) - a collection 
of phenotypic features which are mainly present in most of its instances, though which particular sub-set of 
those features are present in any particular instance will vary over evolutionary time (Keller et al. 2003; 
Rieppel 2005; Wilson et al. 2007; Brigandt 2009). The upshot is clear: on this conception, a homologue is 
not defined by all or any one such feature (nor any particular sub-set thereof), and thus the morphological 
variation of those features throughout its instances poses no individuative problems. Plausibly though, if 
the unity that HPC-homologues are meant to provide to their variously distinct morphological instances 
is to be taken with ontological sincerity, it must be one underwritten by a shared developmental 
mechanism which is present in each of those instances, and which is in some way causally responsible for 
the clustering of certain features throughout them (Elder 2007). However, discerning such a mechanism 
has proven problematic as even the most paradigmatic homologues are now known to have been 
underwritten by a series of distinct developmental mechanisms over evolutionary timescales - a 
phenomenon commonly known as hierarchical disconnect (Hall 2003; Müller 2003; Ereshefsky 2009). 
In light of this phenomenon, some have argued that the homeostatic mechanisms which ground 
the “unity amidst variation” of homologues need not solely consist of intrinsic properties, but might also 
to be comprised of extrinsic ones - namely those which specify historical, lineage-specifying relations – e.g. 
lines of descent and gene flow, histories of selective pressures, etc. (LaPorte 2004; Elder 2007; Wilson et 
al. 2007). These extrinsically-specified mechanisms will certainly be “present” in every instance of a 
homologue (given that such histories aren‟t variable), and be explanatory with respect to the presence of a 
particular sub-set of clustered features in any particular instance - but is that enough? Recall that for 
developmentalists, the nature of a homologue is meant to play an important role in causally determining 
the structure of that clustering over time – that is, in determining which particular morphological features 
are the possible and likely members of those clusters throughout its instances. That relevant homeostatic 
mechanism must, in other words, be responsible for the developmental constraints which give that structure 
                                                     
1 It should be noted that phylogenetic accounts have an analogous problem of sorts, given that they require a 
precisely defined notion of  a „character‟ in order to be able to subsequently pick-out/define a varied set of the same 
character over lineages. This isn‟t trivial - see Richards (2003).  
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its shape – a prominent theme in evo-devo research (Hendrikse et al. 2007; Brakefield 2011; Laland et al. 
2015). 
With that in mind, some have confronted the challenge from the phenomenon of hierarchical 
disconnect by identifying a homologue not with any specific molecular mechanism, but rather with a 
particular higher-order, idealised causal structure which many such mechanisms may realise – one which 
maps out its underlying mechanism‟s potentialities for morphological variability, and so reflects the causal 
contours of its developmental constraints (Wagner & Stadler 2003; Brigandt 2007; Hallgrimson et al. 2012; 
Otsuka forthcoming). On this view, while the individuation of homologues remains an intrinsic affair, and 
the identification of a homologue across its various instances in some way ontologically depends upon 
molecular mereology, the identity which unites those instances is grounded not in the uniformity of their 
constituents, but in the equivalency of the developmentally salient causal-cum-modal structure instantiated 
by those constituents.2 In allowing the individuation of homologues to be conceptually unfettered from 
their molecular moorings, and by basing that identity in the specified potential for morphological 
variation, this sort of view avoids many of the aforementioned worries. However, its dependence on 
abstract measures of developmental potential (and the limits thereof) courts the further concern that it 
may in practice be rather difficult to discover and distinguish homologues in this fashion: discriminating 
between morphological variations which have not appeared throughout various instantiations of a 
homologue because its nature causally prohibits them from doing so and those which are so permitted 
though absent as a matter of mere historical accident, for instance, is a subtle and difficult affair (Olson 
2012; Ramsey & Peterson 2012). 
 Interestingly, addressing the complexities that accompany this idealisation strategy may turn out 
to be an unnecessary conceptual detour as recent empirical evo-devo research has suggested that the 
phenomenon of hierarchical disconnect may be merely superficial, and that there might be intrinsic 
molecular mechanisms which ground homologue identity after all: namely, smaller sub-sets of the 
developmental mechanisms which are generatively responsible for homologue development - often 
referred to as „kernels‟ or „character identity networks‟ - which have been shown to be phylogenetically 
invariant throughout various intra- and inter-species instances of certain homologues (Davidson & Erwin 
2006; Wagner 2007, 2014). Whether the stability of such finely-grained sub-systems over evolutionary 
timescales is sufficient to establish metaphysical identity among the morphologically disparate forms of 
homologues, and whether the generative competency of these systems can be shown to be sufficient in 
causally controlling the specified development of homologues (and the various permutations of their 
instances) remains to be seen.3 
 
3. Organismal Ontology & Explanation 
Although they may diverge with respect to how and why the developmental machinery which underwrite 
homologues are biologically significant, both the phylogenetic and developmentalist perspective agree that 
such sub-systems function as modular units of ontogenic construction. But what precisely are these 
developmental modules of which individual organisms are composed? Following the outstanding successes of 
the reductionist paradigm in 20th century biology, and in the wake of the advent of systems biology, the 
most popular answer is that organisms are fundamentally “made of” mechanisms (Hall 2003; Canestro et al 
                                                     
2 Due to their definition via an abstract causal structure which tracks developmental modalities, a case can be made 
that developmental constraints are at least partly established by extrinsic factors – esp. selective pressures. See 
Sansom (2009).  
3 For empirical case studies on this capacity see Hallgrimsson et al. (2007), Young et al. (2010), and Rasskin-Gutman 
& Esteve-Altava (2014). 
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2007; Laubichler 2010).4 This new mechanism movement (Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 2002; Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen 2005) has two component claims – one concerning mereology, the other the nature of 
explanation.5 The first claim is that organisms are composed of discrete collections of distinct „elements‟ 
which are structurally organised and causally connected by their various isolatable „activities‟. The second 
claim is that organismal alterations are best conceptualised as the causal product of these activities‟ 
facilitation of a step-wise, temporally successive series of state-changes in these elements.6 In virtue of its 
appeal to particular sets of entities and their interactivities, this mechanistic model is purported to provide 
a more causally discerning, “ontic” form of explanation (Salmon 1984; Craver 2014) – one whose 
heuristic value outstrips the mere post-hoc predictive prowess of the once prominent deductive-
nomological model (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005; Kaplan & Craver 2011).7  
 As intuitively plausible and widely adopted as this new mechanism movement is, both of its 
central claims are not without scrutiny in the contemporary literature. Consider first the mereological 
claim. Note that the ontological division of organisms into discrete mechanistic sub-systems is meant to 
reflect the modularity of their development, a feature which is now widely recognised to be a sine quo non of 
their participation in the evolutionary process (Callebaut & Rasskin-Gutman 2005; Erwin & Davidson 
2009). In virtue of what then are these collections of entities and activities discrete? In other words, what 
defines their boundaries? An intuitive answer is that some causal relevance criterion will do this work: because 
every member of a mechanism must be causally connected to some other, the ontological border of a 
mechanism plausibly traces the edges of its interactionist web.8 One way that this criterion has been 
metaphysically cashed out is via Craver‟s (2007) mutual manipulation model, built from Woodward‟s (2002) 
influential account of causation. The model proposes a simple test for mechanism membership: any 
alteration in the activity of an entity belonging to a mechanism must result in an alteration in the activity of the 
mechanism, and vice-versa.  
 Though prima facie plausible, a bi-directional boundary building test based on counterfactual 
discrimination may be problematic in the biological realm (McManus 2012). For instance, in one direction 
of dependency, it may be too restrictive, and generate false negatives: the holistic, mechanism-level 
activity of complex biological systems is often impervious to minor alterations in the activities of their 
constituents – a phenomenon known as robustness (Kitano 2004; Whitacre & Bender 2010). In the other 
direction, it may be too permissive, and generate false positives: a large swathe of organismal features 
(both morphological and behavioural) bear counterfactual dependence relations to extra-organismal, 
environmental stimuli, as evidenced by the well-known phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity (West-Eberhard 
2003; Fusco & Minelli 2010).9  
                                                     
4 For a good overview of the philosophical distinctions between „machines‟ and „mechanisms‟, their historical 
interplay within the history of science, and what‟s “new” about the new mechanism movement, see Allen (2005) and 
Nicholson (2012). 
5 There are mechanists who go beyond the explanatory claim and hold that biological causation itself just is 
mechanism-mediated influence, but this is an extreme view that I don‟t have time to consider here. For an overview, 
see Williamson (2011), and for a critique see Casini (2016). 
6 The degree to which these models generalise “outwards” is a subject of contention, with some going so far as to 
propose a mechanistically-mediated causal model for the process of natural selection. For discussion, see Skipper & 
Millstein (2005) and Barros (2008). 
7 Although it‟s an intuitive notion, determining precisely what an ontic mode of explanation amounts to and what 
distinguishes it from epistemic modes isn‟t without its difficulties - see Wright (2012) and Illari (2013).  
8 Recent attempts to conceptualise the „developmental hourglass‟ may lend credence to this idea: in this period, 
either there is no modularity (because no boundaries of causal connectivity exist), or there is just one module (because 
there is a single interactionist web). See Galis & Metz (2001), Kalinka et al. (2010), and Stergachis et al. (2013). 
9 Due in part to the widespread acknowledgement of the importance of this sort of phenomenon, the more general 
question of what exactly it is for an organism to be properly bounded is both vibrant and open. See Pradeu et al. (2011), 
and Bouchard & Huneman (2013). 
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Having a sufficient condition for membership is crucial, as mechanisms are individuated by their 
composition – namely, by their mereological constituents (entities) arranged in a specific spatio-temporal 
and causal structure (activities). Because individuation criteria are linked to persistence conditions (as the 
latter fail to be met whenever the former do), this entails that any particular mechanism persists just as long 
as its specific mereological composition does. But here too a seemingly plausible tenet of the mechanistic 
conceptualisation of organismal sub-systems has been subject to scrutiny. As mentioned above, biological 
systems are notoriously robust to perturbation and can continue appropriately functioning in the event of 
losing some sub-set of their mereological make-up either in virtue of (a) their possession of a redundant 
duplicate sub-set which takes up the lost set‟s causal role within the system (Zhenglong et al. 2003; 
MacNeil & Walhout 2011), or (b) elements within the system forming novel causal connections which 
collectively compensate for the loss of that set‟s role to retain functioning (Edelman & Gally 2001; Mason 
2010). The worry here is simple: according to their composition-based individuation criterion, the 
mechanist appears committed to the truth of the counter-intuitive claim that, metaphysically speaking, no 
organismal sub-system genuinely persists through such robustness phenomena, as the loss of a constitutive 
element, or the acquisition of a novel causal connection among those elements marks the appearance of a 
novel mechanism. Intuitively though, this is the wrong result - one and the same system is robust, and its 
exhibiting that robustness ought not amount to its dissolution. 
Some mechanists see the worry as misplaced, noting that the compositional stability that 
individuates mechanisms is merely a heuristic necessity applicable only to models of mechanisms: the 
biological realm is not mereologically dissected into frozen collections of unalterable clockwork, even if 
our models of that realm must be (Craver 2006; Levy & Bechtel 2013; Brigandt 2013; Bechtel 2015). 
Others have taken a more ontological angle, arguing that the individuation of mechanisms ought to 
include their active role in delimiting a certain range of ontological dynamism among their constituents 
and activities: given that the characteristic function of biological systems is often (if not always) expressed 
via a kind of controlled fluctuation of their compositional elements and the causal connectives between 
them over time, a directive principle of constitutional dynamism must be incorporated in to our 
„mechanism‟ concept (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2010; Brigandt 2015; Kaplan 2015). 
The judgement that this latter move is a rather desperate attempt to salvage a sinking mereology 
has fuelled the resurgence of the alternate understanding of the nature of these systems found in process 
ontology, according to which what is robustly stable in the biological world are not particularised collections 
of causally structured entities, but the more general patterns of activity in which various such collections 
participate over time (Dupre 2013; Henning & Scarfe 2013; Jaeger & Monk 2015).10 On the process 
perspective, the essence of a biological system is the dynamical flow which constitutes its proper functioning 
and which persists throughout the veritable Hericlitian flux of the underlying elements which realise that 
activity at any time (Cahoone 2013; Jaeger & Monk 2015). For its defenders, only a process ontology is 
capable of accurately modelling both the developmental and evolutionary phenomena associated with 
biological systems as their flexible, problem-solving nature effectively outstrips the conceptual categories 
that a mechanistic mereology affords. 
 Those unimpressed with the mereology of the new mechanists have also expressed scepticism 
regarding its other central conceptual pillar – namely, the claim that biological phenomena associated with 
organismal sub-systems are best explained mechanistically. There‟s little doubt that the conceptualisation 
of such phenomena as the causal products of step-wise, temporally successive series of state-changes in 
structurally organised sets of elements is one which outperforms its deductive-nomological theoretic 
                                                     
10 Interestingly, Waddington (1957), the main proponent of a process ontology and a corresponding non-
mechanistic, topological explanatory tool-kit for the biological realm was deeply influenced by the modern 
philosophical progenitor of that ontology, Whitehead (1925).  
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predecessor: it delivers an ontologically discerning model whose predictive prowess is both nuanced and 
comprehensive. However, though the mechanistic model has been richly explanatory with respect to a 
wide variety of biological phenomena, recent years have seen a rise in interest in the predictive pedigree of 
a class of models which are strikingly non-mechanistic: they are not constituted by spatio-temporally 
structured sets of localised centres of causal interactivities, and their explanatory power is not derived 
from tracing the spatio-temporal transition of the state values of a set of discrete elements. Instead, these 
models typically represent ontogenic systems holistically, viewing them as a kind of higher-order, causally 
unified entity, and describe their primary structure quantitatively, often via mathematical relations, especially 
non-linear, partial differential equations. In contrast to the mechanistic explanatory strategy, these models 
do not offer compositional explanations for biological phenomena, ones which appeal to particularities of 
the system‟s mereological make-up and their arrangement, but rather formal ones, grounded in 
mathematical, abstract structural features of the system as a whole (Winther 2006). 
 A well-known paragon of the successful utilisation of this non-mechanistic strategy is dynamic 
systems theory, wherein organismal sub-systems are modelled as abstract, multi-dimensional state spaces 
bounded by a set of axes which represent genetic expression levels and composed of coordinates which 
represent possible total system states (i.e. possible system-wide genetic expression values).11 In these 
models, each point within a system‟s state space is not only vectorised toward its neighbours, but is also 
assigned a certain stability measure (represented by an additional, upward axis) which reflects the 
probability of the system to transition from its current total state to a neighbouring one. The resulting 
state-space is a structured topology of high peaks and low-lying valleys where the characteristic 
functioning of the system is modelled as the tracing of a continuous series of temporally successive 
transitions through the coordinates of that space - from the “heights” of regulatory instability to the 
“depths” of regulatory stability (Wang et al. 2011; Huang 2012; Davila-Velderrain et al. 2015). Importantly, 
on this model, the particularities of that functioning are explained by the topological features of state space: 
appeals to the curvature gradient of its slopes, the directed descent of its valleys, and the high walls of its 
basins all feature in geometric-cum-kinetic explanations of the specificities of the system‟s dynamics with 
respect to everything from robustness (Kitano 2004; Huang 2009; Huneman 2010) to developmental constraints 
(Wang et al. 2011; Jaeger et al. 2015).12  
While those advocating for a process ontology have expectedly embraced and claimed for their 
own the impressive non-compositional explanatory power of these non-mechanistic models, the reaction 
from the new mechanism perspective has been varied. On one extreme, a prominent response has been 
that, contrary to appearances, these dynamical models possess no genuine explanatory power. This denial is 
based on the claim that these models misrepresent: they capture a merely “phenomenal” feature of a system, 
one derived from and dependent upon the particularities of its underlying dynamic structure. The worry is 
that such a model is incapable of meeting a plausible requirement for being genuinely explanatory – 
namely, having the capability of being utilised to discern the causal foundations of a system‟s production of 
that phenomenal feature (or any others) in a principled fashion (Craver 2008; 2014).13 Significant 
predictive utility notwithstanding, any model which represents a system abstractly is one which fails to 
properly carve it at its causal joints, and is thus incapable of being utilised to genuinely explain the 
occurrence of any phenomena it may otherwise usefully serve to predict. 
                                                     
11 I‟ve limited my discussion here to dynamic systems theory, but there are plenty of other non-mechanistic 
explanatory models which have recently been the subject of discussion and debate: so-called “design principles” 
come to mind – see Braillard (2010), Green (2015), Brigandt, Green & O‟Malley (forthcoming). 
12 DST is now rather widely applied in analyses of everything from sub-organismal cell-fate (Bhattacharya et al. 2011; 
Verd et al. 2014) to the evolvability of organism populations (Striedter 1998; Jaeger & Monk 2014). 
13 Though see Franklin-Hall (2016) for some doubts on whether mechanistic models themselves are capable of 
sufficiently meeting this requirement. 
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A more measured response has stemmed from the general recognition that a model‟s being in 
some sense abstract doesn‟t entail its inability to accurately discern and capture a system‟s causal structure, 
and therefore its inability to genuinely possess explanatory power (Reutlinger & Andersen forthcoming). An 
elucidation of this idea is the claim that if these abstract, formal models are genuinely explanatory with 
respect to their phenomena, they are so in virtue of their features being appropriately mapped on to an 
underlying mechanistic structure – that is, just in case their mathematical variables correctly correspond to 
sets of entities, and their equations accurately capture the causal relations among them (Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen 2010; Kaplan & Craver 2011; Kaplan & Bechtel 2011). According to this perspective, the 
empirical success of the explanatory principles employed in higher-order, dynamical models doesn‟t pose 
a serious threat to the reign of the mechanistic explanatory paradigm, as any heuristic advantage that the 
former type of model might have is one ultimately awarded to it by the merits of the latter. 
 However, perhaps the most popular response to the empirical successes of non-mechanistic 
models has been to embrace explanatory pluralism – the view that there are many equally valid ways in 
which models might explain biological phenomena. Most who adopt this position view abstract, non-
compositional models as conceptually complimentary to their mechanistic counterparts: they are non-
overlapping magisteria, each offering unique explanatory virtues either to distinct types of phenomena, or 
else to distinct facets of the same phenomena (Brigandt 2013; Green et al. 2014; Thery 2015; Mekios 
2015). It may be, for instance, that the formal structures of these abstract models, constructed as they 
often are from mathematical-cum-topological relations, license an explanatory prowess of a distinctly 
stronger sort: instead of merely providing causal explanations of particular states of the systems they 
represent, they may also elucidate certain modal features of those systems which explain the constraints 
on all of their possible states (Lange 2013; Huneman 2015; Breidenmoser & Wolkenhauer 2015). 
Moreover, if the formal structures of these non-mechanistic models are capable of correctly capturing 
central features of the causal architecture of biological systems (as suggested above), the adoption and 
subsequent refinement of such models may even heuristically aid in the process of mechanism discovery 
and elucidation (Fagan 2012; Zednik 2015; Baetu 2015).14 Explanatory pluralism‟s popularity doubtlessly 
derives in part from this characteristically conciliatory approach: it permits non-mechanistic explanation 
to be both possible and uniquely powerful without its being methodologically privileged.  
 
4. Developmental Information  
Deciding which ontological framework best captures the nature of the organismal sub-systems causally 
responsible for specified morphological development, as well as within which modelling schema that 
responsibility is best situated is of central importance. However, quite independent of the outcome of 
those decisions is another, more fine-grained and arguably, foundational metaphysical issue to be 
adjudicated concerning the nature of the fundamental causal-cum-structural feature of nearly every 
significant biological system, and so the proper definition of one of the most fundamental concepts in 
biology – information. But for a concept so ubiquitous and indeed, essential in the elucidation of both 
developmental and evolutionary processes, it is one upon which there is a great divergence of opinion. 
 By far the most widely discussed and controversial application of the concept of biological 
information is to the relation between gene and form, where the genome is said to “contain information 
about” the morphological profile an organism. Very roughly, that relationship is thought to exist because, 
according to the standard conception of information introduced by Claude Shannon (1948), the states of 
the genome (its particular members and their order) are robustly correlated with the states of that profile 
(its possession of certain phenotypic features and their particularities). This correlative co-variance of 
                                                     
14 See MacLeod & Nersessian (2013) for an interesting case-study in this kind of complimentary research activity. 
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state values is meant to demarcate the specialised and unique role that the genome plays in establishing the 
“developmental program” of organism-building, and thus, its privileged place in the conceptual hierarchy 
of the causal structure of ontogenesis. 
However, recent empirical research has called the uniqueness of this role into question, and with 
it, the developmental centrality of the genome. For we now know that the wide-range of intra-specific 
variations on the phenotypic features which comprise an organism‟s morphological profile are causally 
correlated with variations in extra-organismal, environmental factors – this is the phenomenon of 
phenotypic plasticity, now thought to play a crucial role in the process of natural selection (West-Eberhard 
2003; Whitman & Agrawal 2009; Gilbert & Epel 2015). How precisely one ought to respond to the 
seemingly natural implication of this phenomenon – namely, that an organism‟s environment also 
“contains information” about its morphological development, and in just the same way its genome does – 
has divided philosophical opinion. Some philosophers, in endorsing what‟s known as developmental systems 
theory, have understood the informational parity that obtains between genome and environment as 
reflecting the presence of a more general and comprehensive causal parity according to which there simply 
are no ontologically privileged causal factors in the process of development (Oyama 2000; Griffiths & 
Hochman 2015).15 Most have taken this to mean that the supposedly unique, more robust sense in which 
the genome “contains information” about that process is either a heuristically useful fiction (Levy 2011), 
or else merely a conceptual artefact of an illustrative metaphor (Griffiths 2001). 
But perhaps the most prevalent reaction in the literature has been to insist that the genome must 
contain information about the process of development in a way that extra-genetic factors do not, and that 
adequately capturing that fact will require a reformation of, or refinement on our current concept of 
information (at least, in its biological context). The focus toward that end has largely been centred on the 
genome‟s principal role in shaping that process – its being causally responsible for the production of the 
proteome, the set of macromolecules which actively regulate the orchestration of, as well as 
mereologically make-up morphological features. One particularly prominently explored avenue has been 
to claim that the information relation that exists between gene and protein is substantially more robust 
than can be captured by the conceptual framework of Shannon information: it is characterised by the 
correlative co-variance of state-values, but it also has two additional important features which are often 
attributed to so-called semantic concepts of information. Firstly, unlike the relation of Shannon 
information which makes no directional distinction between „source‟ and „signal‟, it is asymmetric: as 
enshrined in Crick‟s (1958) “Central Dogma” of molecular biology, there is a privileged “direction of 
flow” of information between gene and protein such that the former informs the latter, but not vice-versa 
(Godfrey-Smith 2007). Secondly, unlike the relation of Shannon information which is an “all or nothing” 
affair, it is error-capacitive: the information which genes contain about their particular protein products 
remains intact even in cases where various disturbing factors result in that content being misrepresented in 
the proteins which result from their expression, as is the case in, for instance, splicing errors (Griffiths 
2006).  
 These two features are meant to indicate that the information which genes contain about their 
protein products has content richer than can be expressed by the entropy-measures of Shannon 
correlations, but the question then is: what precisely does this semantic content amount to?16 A popular 
answer is that this content is a non-representational form of semiotic meaning: in the context of the 
interpretative role of the cellular machinery of transcription and translation, the triplets of nucleotide 
                                                     
15 There are a variety of ways in which the notion of parity is fleshed-out in developmental systems literature – see 
Stegmann (2012) for an overview.  
16 Semantic concepts of information are meant to feature meaningful content in a richer sense than, for instance, the 
„natural meaning‟ proposed by Grice (1957) and subsequently adopted by Dretske (1981). 
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bases which comprise the genome are symbols for their protein products (Godfrey-Smith 2000; Sternely 
2000; Barberi 2003).17 Given that the correlation between the genome and its particular protein products 
is in an important sense arbitrary – that is, it is not strictly determined by the physio-chemical properties of 
the genome, but is instead established via the accidental vagaries of its selective history, this code-based 
semantic content is understood to be suitably naturalistic (Maynard Smith 2000; Sarkar 2003; Bergstrom & 
Rosvall 2011). Indeed, following Millikan‟s (1984) influential teleosemantic account of meaning, the typical 
understanding is that the „selected-for‟ symbolic content the genome possesses grounds its normative 
character: it dictates the proper direction of information flow, as well as whether that information is 
misrepresented in particular cases. That said, there is reason to think that the teleosemantic account of the 
informational content of the genome is incapable of capturing the unique relation between it and the 
proteome. It‟s questionable, for instance, whether the informational content determined by a selected-for 
history is sufficiently able to capture the robust prescriptive element of that relation (Kjosavik 2007; Kumar 
2013). Even if it were, it‟s unlikely that the containing of such information would single-out the genome 
in any privileged fashion, as teleosemantic content about the proteome seemingly must also be attributed 
to accidental and unrelated “genetic hitchhikers” (Davies 2001; Wheeler 2007), and potentially even the 
environment at large (Jablonka 2002).  
 Those who have judged the teleosemantic account as inadequate have typically offered an 
external critique, arguing that it is mistaken ab initio: rather than attempting to derive semiotic content 
from the historically contingent, selective assignment of particular genome-proteome relations, we ought 
instead to do so from the particularities of that relation itself – that is, from the causally unique character 
of that relation within the process of ontogenesis. By far the most prominent approach from this 
perspective has been an attempt to show that it is the causal specificity of that relation which captures the 
“content” of informational significance which is unique to the genome (Davidson 2001; Weber 2006; 
Waters 2007; Griffiths et al. 2015). One quite popular way of spelling that out utilises insights from 
Woodward‟s (2003; 2010) manipulation account of causation, showing that the state of genes causally co-vary 
with the states of proteins in a very “fine-grained” fashion (in a way that other developmentally salient 
causal factors do not): alterations in the states of the proteome bear a systematically precise pattern of 
counterfactual dependence upon the alterations in the states of the genome (mutations, deletions, etc.) 
such that minute changes in the former reliably track minute changes in the latter.18 
A prevalent way of cashing out that idea is grounded in the instructional role of the genome – that 
is, its operation as a causally selective ordering function which determines the linear, structural organisation 
of its protein products (Stegmann 2005, 2014; Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno 2006; Sustar 2007; Bogen & 
Machamer 2011). Relying more closely upon the conception of the genome as a symbolic code, according to 
the concept of what‟s sometimes referred to as “Crick information” (Griffiths & Stotz 2013), the 
genome‟s semiotic content consists in the sequential ordering of its constitutive elements which serve as a 
causal template for the specific serialised patterning of the amino acids which compose proteins. While no 
one disputes that the genome plays this causally specific role in protein production, opinion is divided on 
whether that role is sufficiently robust for it to entail the genome containing information in any rich sense: 
the correlative relation between gene and protein is a complex one, and due to a variety of pre- and post-
transcriptional cellular processes, it is one which can often fail to exhibit the covariance sensitivity which 
an informational relation seemingly requires (Stotz 2006; Wheeler 2007; Stotz & Griffiths forthcoming). 
However, recent computational analyses have indicated that even in particular instances of strict 
covariance failure the proteome unfailingly preserves a rather specific „genomic footprint‟, and the 
                                                     
17 A notable exception is Shea‟s (2007; 2011) „infotel‟ account of semantic information, which assigns the genome 
truly representational content (even about phenotypic traits) on account of its selected-for history. 
18 Woodward‟s criterion for causality has its roots in Lewis‟ (2000) relation of „causal influence‟. 
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possibility of tracing that template throughout the translation process may be sufficient for attributing 
significant semiotic informational content to the genome, though this requires a more subtle analysis 
(Sarkar 2003; Scherrer & Jost 2007; Stadler et al. 2009).  
 Whether any of these ways of cashing out the content of „genetic information‟ – be they semantic 
or semiotic – offer a promising way forward in elucidating the now elusive link between gene and form 
remains to be seen. With the advent of contemporary systems biology and increasingly precise 
experimentation techniques, we now have a deeper understanding of the developmental architecture 
responsible for morphological generation as consisting not just of sets of genes, but of genetic regulatory 
networks – sets of genes intimately interconnected in dynamically structured systems of causal 
interdependencies (Davidson et al. 2002; Kitano 2002; Busser et al. 2008). It may be that the causal-cum-
structural complexities of these networks requires any understanding of that link to take place within a 
novel, more distributive conception of „information‟ (Jablonka 2002; Keller 2009; Pigliucci 2010; Stotz  & 
Griffiths forthcoming), perhaps even one wherein the these networks are more akin to information processors, 
rather than producers (Planer 2013; Calcott 2014; Austin 2015). Whatever the way forward, getting clearer 
on whether and to what extent the conceptual framework of a suitably refined information theory offers 
the heuristic resources to understand the process of morphological development and ultimately, the 
process of evolution, remains a central concern for philosophers of biology. 
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